How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents
Abstract
The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.
Citation
APA: Yonathan Arbel, Simon Goldstein, Peter N. Salib. (2026). How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6273198
Bluebook: Yonathan Arbel, Simon Goldstein, Peter N. Salib, How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents, 2026, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6273198.
Summary (English)
# How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents ## TL;DR The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans. ## Core Contributions * **Thin identity:** law needs a way to tie AI actions to accountable human principals. * **Thick identity:** direct governance of AI behavior requires stable legal units for agents that copy, split, merge, and swarm. * **A-corp proposal:** a legal-fictional entity can connect human ownership with AI-run operations.
One-page summary
# How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents — one-page summary **Paper ID:** `ssrn-6273198` **Year:** 2026 **Author(s):** Yonathan Arbel, Simon Goldstein, Peter N. Salib **SSRN:** https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6273198 ## TL;DR The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans. ## Keywords AI agents; individuation; liability; algorithmic corporation; agency law; artificial intelligence governance ## Files - Full text: `papers/ssrn-6273198/paper.txt` - PDF: `papers/ssrn-6273198/paper.pdf` - Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-6273198/summary.md` _Auto-generated study aid. For canonical content, rely on `paper.txt`/`paper.pdf`._
Study pack
# Study pack: How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents (ssrn-6273198) - SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6273198 - Full text: `papers/ssrn-6273198/paper.txt` - Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-6273198/summary.md` ## Elevator pitch The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans. ## Keywords / concepts AI agents; individuation; liability; algorithmic corporation; agency law; artificial intelligence governance ## Suggested questions (for RAG / study) - What is the paper’s main claim and what problem does it solve? - What method/data does it use (if any), and what are the main results? - What assumptions are doing the most work? - What are the limitations or failure modes the author flags? - How does this connect to the author’s other papers in this corpus? _Auto-generated study aid. For canonical content, rely on `paper.txt`/`paper.pdf`._