NANO CONTRACTS 11/14/2023 2:12 AM
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Abstract
Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that new technologies are enabling "nano contracts"—extremely small-scale agreements governing ephemeral, minuscule-value interactions previously outside formal law. While nano contracts can unlock new opportunities and efficiencies, they also carry significant risks, challenge effective regulation, could collapse private law boundaries, and reveal scale's neglected role in private law.
Citation
APA: Yonathan Arbel. (2023). NANO CONTRACTS 11/14/2023 2:12 AM. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4631897
Bluebook: Yonathan Arbel, NANO CONTRACTS 11/14/2023 2:12 AM, 2023, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4631897.
Summary (English)
Here is the bullet list for 'ssrn-4631897' by Professor Yonathan Arbel: ## TL;DR ≤100 words Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that new technologies are enabling "nano contracts"—extremely small-scale agreements governing ephemeral, minuscule-value interactions previously outside formal law. While nano contracts can unlock new opportunities and efficiencies, they also carry significant risks, challenge effective regulation, could collapse private law boundaries, and reveal scale's neglected role in private law. ## Section Summaries ≤120 words each * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that new contracting trends and technologies are facilitating "nano contracts," extremely small-scale agreements for ephemeral, low-value interactions previously outside formal law. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while these nano contracts offer new opportunities, they also carry significant risks, challenge effective regulation, and could ultimately collapse private law boundaries, revealing scale's neglected role in private law. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes to introduce the concept of nano contracts, exploring their fundamental aspects including platforms, protocols, and necessary legal technology. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the paper then delves into specific applications like nano lines, nano leases, nano gigs, and nano accidents, examining the legal policy implications for each. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that, drawing an analogy to Richard Feynman's call to explore nanotechnology, current technological trends demonstrate a dramatic miniaturization of contract scale. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this changed, smaller scale of contracts has profound implications that his article will explore. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that scale transformations in contracts carry profound legal and social implications, holding both promise and peril if the legal response is inattentive. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that recent technological trends like digitization, XaaS models, and AI agents are creating the infrastructure for "nano contracts," characterized by near-zero latency and extremely low transaction costs. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts are digitally negotiated, automated, near-instantaneous agreements for very small-scale peer-to-peer transactions involving tiny values or fragmented rights, reducing intermediaries. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that these nano contracts challenge classical contract law by blurring distinctions between contractual relationships and spot exchanges, as traditional assumptions about parties, negotiation, and value may not hold. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the small scale of emerging "nano contracts" introduces novel legal classification questions, potentially making current regulatory frameworks fragile. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts are distinct from smart contracts because their primary ambition is to solve contract formation for very small transactions, often using P2P digital protocols. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts hold potential for profound social and economic change by transforming common interactions governed by social norms, like queuing, into formal market transactions. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while this presents opportunities for new markets, it also raises concerns about excessive commodification and economic disparities, similar to evaluations of the gig economy. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that his article examines the intersection of scale, contracts, and technology, engaging with discussions on the gig economy, platform regulation, and equitable benefit distribution from innovation. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the article introduces "nano contracts" via a thought experiment, like a four-way stop, to show their potential, dangers, and implications for markets in goods previously unalienable due to negotiation costs. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that current traffic laws mechanistically allocate the right-of-way using a "first in first out" principle, often ignoring crucial factors like need or urgency. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while a system prioritizing based on individual circumstances is desirable and efficient, designing it presents significant practical challenges. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts, facilitated by an application, could manage traffic right-of-way through automated, near-instantaneous auctions where drivers bid small amounts based on stated urgency. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this system aims to allocate priority based on actual needs, potentially making traffic flow more efficiently, fairly, and safely. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while nano contracts offer potential to solve inefficiencies like optimizing traffic flow, they also raise significant ethical and legal concerns regarding wealth disparity, commodification, and breaches. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that to counter skepticism, he will show how scale transformations in contracts historically led to profound social outcomes and how platforms and protocols can address practical challenges. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while platforms introduce market power risks, alternatives like protocols, though harder to develop, can facilitate transactions and make nano contracts feasible. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that contract history, viewed through scale, reveals an evolution of legal technology supporting increasingly smaller, more flexible transactions, from massive corporate deals to small gig contracts. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that society has historically moved from rigid, status-defined roles towards more modular, voluntary transactions facilitated by contract development. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this profound shift continues, with Jonathan Yovel's examination of J.S. Bach's life illustrating an individual's transition from a status-based existence. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that J.S. Bach's move to a contract-based position exemplifies the societal shift from status to contract, a change he embraced for its freedom. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the gig economy, enabled by platforms like Uber and Airbnb, is a more recent transformative innovation reshaping work, travel, and business. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the gig economy, via internet infrastructure, profoundly impacted society by downscaling traditional contracts into short, small-scale "micro contracts" for services like single rides. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this downscaling represents a continuous historical arc—from status to contract to gigs—where reduced transactional block size has consistently transformed the transactional world. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts use digital infrastructure for automated, real-time, P2P bargaining between strangers, employing various forms like auctions, though their multi-dimensional small scale makes precise definition difficult. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that these contracts are a natural continuation of trends like digitization, with the "XaaS" (Everything as a Service) model being a significant, often overlooked, enabler. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the "Everything-as-a-Service" (XaaS) model signifies a market shift towards "nanonization of products," disaggregating product bundles into specific, on-demand functions like Trringo's farming equipment services. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this trend shows market need for unbundled goods; nano contracts differ from XaaS by facilitating more P2P transactions with less intermediation. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that smart contracts primarily aim to streamline contract execution, often using blockchain for trust between unknown parties. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this focus on execution fundamentally distinguishes smart contracts from nano contracts, which are mainly tools for low-cost, near-instantaneous contract formation. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that for nano contracts to facilitate real-time digital P2P transactions, triangulation costs (locating providers, settling prices, agreeing on terms) must be exceedingly small due to minimal transactional surplus. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that contract formation must also be streamlined, as costly procedures would deter parties from using nano contracts. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that for nano contracts to function, unlike macro contracts, assent expression must have minimal friction and cost, as slight delays would render these rapid transactions impossible. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracting also demands speedy, secure, inexpensive payment processing, alongside available, trustworthy dispute resolution and effective enforcement. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts, despite being fragile to transactional costs, can learn from gig economy solutions like platforms and reputation systems to address practical concerns. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that to overcome "triangulation costs," solutions include platform-based marketplaces or protocols allowing direct communication between transacting parties. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the challenge of nano contract formation can be addressed through advance consent and automated negotiations, enabling real-time agreements with minimal latency or cost. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while some argue automated systems lack agency for contractual assent, this is contestable as modern contract law accommodates proxy and digital assent. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Bama School of Law writes that the validity of nano contracts, relying on preestablished digital assent, isn't undermined by the medium itself, given a verifiable pedigree of that assent. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while traditional payment systems are too expensive for micropayments, fintech developments and practices like platform-side accumulation offer solutions. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts face payment challenges due to inefficient infrastructure, requiring solutions like platform payment accumulation or alternative financial tools, highlighting payment inefficiency as a source of platform market power. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that traditional dispute resolution is ill-suited for small-stake contracts, leading the gig economy to use reputation systems and in-house adjudication. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that platforms like Uber use reputation systems, with mutual user reviews, to promote good behavior and accountability without lawsuits. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that for significant transgressions, platforms employ internal dispute resolution, often issuing quick refunds, though this exposes them to class actions and regulatory interventions. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that even in small "nano contracts," like four-way stop interactions, the legal system can intervene to assign fault if a breach causes an accident, providing dispute resolution. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that interpreting digital contracts uses existing common law tools, and as transaction scale decreases, complexity and disagreement potential fall superlinearly. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the cost of small claims lawsuits, often $15-$85, can make legal action for "nano contracts" economically unviable. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that for "micro contracts," this can be addressed through platform dispute resolution, reputation systems, precautionary payments, and escrow services, including blockchain-managed ones. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that after explaining nano contracts' institutional features and policy support, his analysis will explore their transformation of key law areas, focusing on queue regulation. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that lines represent a painful public policy problem when demand outstrips capacity, causing frustration, conflict, and time costs. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that Americans waste billions of dollars and significant time in lines, typically unregulated and governed by social norms that can cause conflict. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that lines operate on a "willingness-to-wait" principle, which can lead to queues expanding until waiting time consumes much of the sought resource's value. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while "first in line" is common but crude, some services offer priority by need or social status. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that online lines, despite seeming convenient, don't increase service capacity and can worsen allocation by removing physical waiting costs, attracting more users including scalpers and bots. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that inefficient line systems persist due to the "verification problem"—authentically managing urgent need claims without significant costs, errors, or gaming. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that even if verification is solved, a "grasshopper problem" arises concerning individuals who don't plan ahead versus prepared "ants." * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that current triage systems, like letting late passengers skip airport security, can create "grasshopper problems" by rewarding reckless planning at the expense of diligent planners. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts offer a solution by enabling parties to negotiate and pay for line positions, verifying urgency through willingness-to-pay and disincentivizing poor planning. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts allow peer-to-peer payments among line participants for priority, ensuring compensation for yielding place goes to others in the queue, not a third party. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this contrasts with commercialized lines where revenue benefits firms or intermediaries, potentially disincentivizing line reduction. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts do not necessarily require money, citing Northwestern's Kellogg School where students use token points to bid for courses. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that to explore why time markets are uncommon, he discusses Professor Oberholzer-Gee's experiment showing increased monetary offers raised willingness to yield a line spot. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that social norms about favors can deter accepting payment to cut in line, as shown by an experiment where higher offers improved responses but repeated attempts met hostility. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts can overcome these frictions by normalizing requests for priority, creating opportunities for mutually beneficial time trades. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano-contracts, as a market-based queuing solution, risk "market creep" into socially-governed areas, raising distributive, efficiency, political, and ethical concerns. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that such commodification faces criticism, notably from Michael Sandel, who argues for the "ethic of the queue," where waiting can better reflect need than willingness-to-pay. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that Michael Sandel's "queue ethic" argument is unpersuasive, questioning its application when a market economy allocates most goods via prices and lines are often downstream of this system. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that commitment to the queue ethic is puzzling given normalized paid priority, and evidence suggests willingness-to-pay, not wait, strongly signals value. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the assumption that 'Willingness to Wait' (WtW) is inherently more progressive than 'Willingness to Pay' (WtP) is incorrect, as free time is unequally distributed, often disadvantaging the poor. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that he argues nano contracts can often be more progressive, as reliance on WtW can be regressive for individuals like poor tenants who lack time. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts can improve line-waiting by offering choices to retain place, idle for compensation, or pay for priority, and proposes tradable priority tokens for vulnerable parties. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while commoditizing lines for private goods may be acceptable, a "queue ethic" should apply to publicly provisioned goods like voting, where market allocation is faulty. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that society has decided certain goods, like votes or emergency medical access, should be allocated outside markets, and commoditizing them via trading can undermine equality and justice. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts could facilitate such undesirable trading, potentially eroding social norms, thus policymakers must identify and regulate these contexts. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while nano contracts offer social utility, an efficiency concern is potential 'cloggers' intentionally creating delays to collect payments from those in a rush. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this 'clogger' problem is likely limited because cloggers bear real costs, and emergent issues could be addressed through indifference or 'keyhole solutions' like bans. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that a vast amount of personal and commercial resources, like cars and office spaces, remain significantly underutilized, representing sheer waste. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts, specifically nano leases, offer a way to utilize this idle capacity, exemplified by services sharing underutilized broadband internet. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that services like Helium for IoT connectivity and Olio for food sharing illustrate "nano leases'" potential to monetize underutilized capacity in everyday transactions. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this extends to clothes rentals and proposes nano contracts as an alternative for disputes over drone aerial passage rights. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano leases could enable individuals to rent out diverse underutilized personal assets, from books to computing power, if transaction costs become sufficiently low. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that despite caveats like physical limits and dispute costs, the gig economy's success suggests many will share assets once transaction costs are significantly reduced. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano leases offer lessors benefits by monetizing underutilized assets for income and improved household liquidity. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that for lessees, nano leases reduce ownership necessity by providing on-demand access and specialization, aligning with Product-as-a-Service models. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts facilitate peer-to-peer leasing for better resource utilization, allowing access to services like laundry or pet location without owning underlying assets. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this emerging nano leasing model challenges traditional ownership, suggesting a potential evolution from property-based systems towards contract-based resource access. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts challenge private ownership, raising concerns about whether temporary, leased interactions diminish autonomy and the developmental link between individuals and property. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that prevalent nano leasing might also undermine the "endowment effect," altering how people value property as it becomes more like trade goods. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that the shift from private ownership, seen with Airbnb, can unexpectedly align with anti-consumerist philosophies critiquing private property and overconsumption. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts, by enabling shared use and reducing waste, offer a "life-as-a-service" model that mitigates environmental impact and disrupts traditional property notions. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that property is best seen as an architectural system for asset use, not separable rights, and emerging "nano contracts" with low transaction costs enable fine-tuned governance mechanisms. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that these nano leases challenge traditional contract law, particularly UCC Articles 2 (Sales) and 2A (Leases), as small-scale leases become hard to distinguish from licenses. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts for excess capacity, like commercializing underutilized broadband, raise distributional policy concerns as this could increase overall usage and service costs, creating unfair cross-subsidies. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that despite these concerns, nano contracting can also reduce net capacity usage and improve welfare, as studies on Uber suggest. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while nano leasing can significantly increase asset utilization, producers might contractually prevent such leases, similar to restricting electronic device repairs. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this shift from property to nano contracts also raises philosophical questions about autonomy, legal questions about contract classification, and distributional concerns. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts could enable "nano jobs," allowing individuals to use idle time for very short, casual paid tasks like data labeling, building on the gig economy model. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this could tap a large, underutilized labor market, offering low-commitment income and potentially progressive widespread opportunities for small paid tasks. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while a common critique is that the gig economy exploits regulatory arbitrage, recent research suggests this may be overstated and platforms can provide significant worker wage benefits. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that a major concern is its potential to transform employment law, designed for worker protection, into mere contractual agreements, creating a less safeguarded worker class. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts, with work measured in minutes, will make traditional employment protections like vacation and minimum wage exceedingly difficult, exacerbating gig worker classification challenges. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that policy responses could include expanding the social safety net or focusing on nano employment as an anti-poverty mechanism. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts in employment offer unmatched flexibility and potential, allowing individuals shunned by traditional labor markets to find income by utilizing extra time. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano work also raises concerns like eroding self-space by expanding work into leisure, and making employment law challenges harder, potentially undermining worker advocacy. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts can expand consensual agreements, thereby converting significant areas of tort law, which typically governs nonconsensual accidents, into contract law. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that this is shown by a train operator using nano contracts for a real-time auction with farmers to determine the least costly direction for spark emission, versus problematic post-harm tort assessments. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts can achieve socially desirable outcomes by enabling "split-second auctions" where parties agree to direct inevitable harm to the least valuable asset, minimizing damage more effectively than retrospective tort law. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that these may also offer distributional advantages, allowing victims more recovery than under tort law, which acts as a backstop. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that nano contracts can efficiently minimize harm and provide agreeable accident compensation, illustrated by a farmer potentially earning more from train-emitted sparks than crops if accidents are frequent, incentivizing prevention. Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while such contracts allow rethinking accident alienability for property damage, caution is warranted for bodily harm due to deep moral norms. * Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that his article aims to explore significant implications of trends like digitization and tokenization leading to smaller "nano" transactions, foreseeing both liberating markets and societal "traffic jams." Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law writes that while nano contracts offer transformative potential, they also present unsettling ethical dilemmas, necessitating further scholarly analysis to guide their future.
One-page summary
# NANO CONTRACTS 11/14/2023 2:12 AM — one-page summary **Paper ID:** `ssrn-4631897` **Year:** 2023 **Author(s):** Yonathan Arbel **SSRN:** https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4631897 ## TL;DR Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that new technologies are enabling "nano contracts"—extremely small-scale agreements governing ephemeral, minuscule-value interactions previously outside formal law. While nano contracts can unlock new opportunities and efficiencies, they also carry significant risks, challenge effective regulation, could collapse private law boundaries, and reveal scale's neglected role in private law. ## Keywords contracts; AI; law ## Files - Full text: `papers/ssrn-4631897/paper.txt` - PDF: `papers/ssrn-4631897/paper.pdf` - Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-4631897/summary.md` - Summary (ZH): `papers/ssrn-4631897/summary.zh.md` _Auto-generated study aid. For canonical content, rely on `paper.txt`/`paper.pdf`._
Study pack
# Study pack: NANO CONTRACTS 11/14/2023 2:12 AM (ssrn-4631897) - SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4631897 - Full text: `papers/ssrn-4631897/paper.txt` - Summary (EN): `papers/ssrn-4631897/summary.md` - Summary (ZH): `papers/ssrn-4631897/summary.zh.md` ## Elevator pitch Professor Yonathan Arbel of the University of Alabama School of Law argues that new technologies are enabling "nano contracts"—extremely small-scale agreements governing ephemeral, minuscule-value interactions previously outside formal law. While nano contracts can unlock new opportunities and efficiencies, they also carry significant risks, challenge effective regulation, could collapse private law boundaries, and reveal scale's neglected role in private law. ## Keywords / concepts contracts; AI; law ## Suggested questions (for RAG / study) - What is the paper’s main claim and what problem does it solve? - What method/data does it use (if any), and what are the main results? - What assumptions are doing the most work? - What are the limitations or failure modes the author flags? - How does this connect to the author’s other papers in this corpus? _Auto-generated study aid. For canonical content, rely on `paper.txt`/`paper.pdf`._
摘要（中文）
好的，这是对Yonathan Arbel教授关于SSRN-4631897论文摘要的正式中文翻译： **论文：ssrn-4631897，作者：Yonathan Arbel教授** ## TL;DR (内容概要 ≤100词) 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授认为，新技术正催生“纳米合同”——这是一种规模极小的协议，用于管理以往游离于正式法律之外的、短暂且价值微不足道的互动。尽管纳米合同能够释放新的机遇并提高效率，但它们也带来了重大风险，对有效监管构成挑战，可能瓦解私法边界，并揭示了规模在私法中被忽视的作用。 ## 各章节摘要 (≤120词/节) * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，新的签约趋势和技术正在推动“纳米合同”的出现，这是一种规模极小的协议，适用于以往游离于正式法律之外的、短暂且价值低廉的互动。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，虽然这些纳米合同带来了新的机遇，但它们也伴随着重大风险，对有效监管构成挑战，并可能最终瓦解私法边界，揭示了规模在私法中被忽视的作用。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，他旨在介绍纳米合同的概念，探讨其基本要素，包括平台、协议和必要的法律技术。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，该论文随后深入研究了具体的应用场景，如纳米排队、纳米租赁、纳米零工和纳米事故，并审查了每种应用的法律政策影响。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，通过类比理查德·费曼探索纳米技术的呼吁，当前的技术趋势显示出合同规模的急剧微型化。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这种合同规模变小所带来的变化具有深远影响，其文章将对此进行探讨。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，合同的规模转变具有深远的法律和社会影响，如果法律应对不力，则既有机遇也有风险。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，近期的技术趋势，如数字化、“X即服务”(XaaS)模式和人工智能代理，正在为“纳米合同”构建基础设施，其特点是近乎零延迟和极低的交易成本。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同是通过数字方式协商、自动化、近乎即时达成的协议，适用于价值微小或权利碎片化的极小规模点对点交易，并减少了中介机构。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这些纳米合同对经典合同法构成了挑战，因为它们模糊了合同关系与即时交换之间的区别，传统的关于当事人、谈判和价值的假设可能不再成立。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，新兴“纳米合同”的小规模特性带来了新的法律分类问题，可能使现有的监管框架变得脆弱。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同不同于智能合约，因为其主要目标是解决极小额交易的合同订立问题，通常使用点对点数字协议。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同通过将以往由社会规范管理的常见互动（如排队）转变为正式的市场交易，具有带来深刻社会和经济变革的潜力。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管这为新市场带来了机遇，但也引发了对过度商品化和经济差距的担忧，类似于对零工经济的评估。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，其文章审视了规模、合同与技术之间的交叉点，并参与了关于零工经济、平台监管以及创新成果公平分配的讨论。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，该文章通过一个思想实验（如四向停车路口）引入“纳米合同”的概念，以展示其潜力、风险以及对因谈判成本过高而以往无法转让的商品市场所产生的影响。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，现行交通法规采用“先到先得”原则机械地分配通行权，往往忽略了需求或紧急程度等关键因素。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管一个基于个体情况优先排序的系统是可取且高效的，但其设计面临重大的实践挑战。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，在应用程序的辅助下，纳米合同可以通过自动化、近乎即时的拍卖来管理交通通行权，驾驶员可根据声称的紧急程度进行小额竞价。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，该系统旨在根据实际需求分配优先权，从而可能使交通流更高效、公平和安全。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管纳米合同具有解决诸如优化交通流等低效问题的潜力，但它们也引发了关于贫富差距、商品化和违约等重大的伦理和法律关切。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，为消除质疑，他将展示合同规模的转变在历史上如何导致深远的社会成果，以及平台和协议如何能够应对实践挑战。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管平台带来了市场势力风险，但协议等替代方案虽然开发难度更大，却能促进交易并使纳米合同变得可行。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，从规模视角审视合同历史，可以揭示法律技术的演进过程，即支持越来越小、越来越灵活的交易，从大型企业交易到小型零工合同。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，历史上，社会已从僵化的、由身份定义的角色转变为由合同促成的、更具模块化和自愿性的交易。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这一深刻转变仍在继续，Jonathan Yovel对J.S.巴赫一生的研究便阐释了个体从基于身份的生存状态向此转变的过程。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，J.S.巴赫转向基于合同的职位，体现了社会从身份到合同的转变，他因其自由而欣然接受了这一变化。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，由优步(Uber)和爱彼迎(Airbnb)等平台赋能的零工经济，是近期一项重塑工作、旅行和商业模式的变革性创新。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，零工经济通过互联网基础设施深刻影响了社会，将传统合同缩小为针对单次乘车等服务的短期、小规模“微合同”。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这种规模的缩小代表了一个持续的历史轨迹——从身份到合同再到零工——其中交易单位规模的减小持续地改变着交易世界。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同利用数字基础设施在陌生人之间进行自动化的、实时的点对点议价，采用拍卖等多种形式，但其多维度的小规模特性使得精确定义变得困难。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这些合同是数字化等趋势的自然延续，“X即服务”(XaaS)模式是一个重要但常被忽视的推动因素。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，“一切即服务”(XaaS)模式标志着市场向“产品纳米化”的转变，将产品组合分解为特定的按需功能，例如Trringo公司的农用设备服务。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这一趋势表明市场对非捆绑商品的需求；纳米合同与XaaS的不同之处在于，它促进了更多中介化程度更低的点对点交易。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，智能合约主要旨在简化合同执行，通常使用区块链来建立未知方之间的信任。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这种对执行的关注从根本上将智能合约与纳米合同区分开来，后者主要是用于低成本、近乎即时达成合同的工具。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，为使纳米合同能够促进实时的数字点对点交易，由于交易盈余极小，交易撮合成本（指寻找供应方、确定价格和商定条款的成本）必须极低。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，合同订立过程也必须简化，因为成本高昂的程序会阻止各方使用纳米合同。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，与宏观合同不同，纳米合同要有效运作，其同意的表达必须具有最小的摩擦和成本，因为轻微的延迟都会使这些快速交易无法实现。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米签约还需要快速、安全、廉价的支付处理，以及可用的、值得信赖的争议解决机制和有效的执行。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同尽管易受交易成本影响，但可以借鉴零工经济的解决方案，如平台和声誉系统，来解决实际问题。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，为克服“交易撮合成本”，解决方案包括基于平台的市场或允许交易方直接通信的协议。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同订立的挑战可以通过事先同意和自动化协商来解决，从而能够以最小的延迟或成本实时达成协议。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管一些人认为自动化系统缺乏达成合同合意的能动性，但这是有争议的，因为现代合同法承认代理和数字形式的合意。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，只要预先建立的数字合意具有可验证的来源，纳米合同的有效性并不会因其媒介本身而受损。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，虽然传统支付系统对于微支付而言成本过高，但金融科技的发展和平台方累积支付等实践提供了解决方案。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，由于基础设施效率低下，纳米合同面临支付挑战，需要平台支付累积或替代性金融工具等解决方案，这凸显了支付效率低下是平台市场势力的一个来源。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，传统的争议解决机制不适用于小额合同，这使得零工经济转而使用声誉系统和内部裁决。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，像优步这样的平台使用声誉系统，通过用户相互评价来促进良好行为和问责制，而无需诉诸法律。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，对于重大违规行为，平台采用内部争议解决机制，通常会快速退款，尽管这使它们面临集体诉讼和监管干预的风险。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，即使在诸如四向停车路口互动这样的小型“纳米合同”中，如果违约导致事故，法律体系也可以介入判定过错，从而提供争议解决方案。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，解释数字合同可使用现有的普通法工具，并且随着交易规模的减小，复杂性和分歧的可能性会超线性地下降。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，小额索赔诉讼的成本通常在15至85美元之间，这可能使得针对“纳米合同”的法律行动在经济上不可行。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，对于“微合同”，这可以通过平台争议解决、声誉系统、预防性付款和第三方托管服务（包括区块链管理的服务）来解决。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，在解释了纳米合同的制度特征和政策支持之后，他的分析将探讨它们如何改变关键法律领域，重点关注排队监管。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，当需求超过供给能力时，排队就成了一个棘手的公共政策问题，会导致挫败感、冲突和时间成本。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，美国人在排队上浪费了数十亿美元和大量时间，排队通常不受监管，而是由可能引发冲突的社会规范所支配。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，排队遵循“等待意愿”原则，这可能导致队列延长，直到等待时间消耗掉所寻求资源的大部分价值。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，虽然“先到先得”很常见但较为粗略，但一些服务会根据需求或社会地位提供优先权。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，在线排队尽管看起来方便，但并不能增加服务容量，反而可能因消除了实体等待成本而吸引更多用户（包括黄牛和机器人），从而恶化分配状况。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，低效的排队系统之所以持续存在，是由于“验证问题”——即如何在没有显著成本、错误或被滥用的情况下，真实地管理紧急需求声明。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，即使解决了验证问题，也会出现关于不提前计划的个人（“蚱蜢”）与有准备的“蚂蚁”之间的“蚱蜢问题”。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，现行的分流系统，如允许迟到的乘客优先通过机场安检，可能会通过奖励鲁莽计划者而损害勤勉计划者的利益，从而造成“蚱蜢问题”。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同提供了一种解决方案，它使各方能够协商并支付排队位置的费用，通过支付意愿来验证紧急程度，并抑制不良计划行为。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同允许排队参与者之间为优先权进行点对点支付，确保让出位置的补偿归于队列中的其他人，而非第三方。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这与商业化排队形成对比，后者中产生的收入使公司或中介受益，可能抑制其减少排队的动机。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同未必需要金钱，他引用了西北大学凯洛格商学院的例子，那里的学生使用积分代币竞拍课程。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，为了探究为何时间市场不常见，他讨论了Oberholzer-Gee教授的实验，该实验表明提高金钱报价会增加人们让出排队位置的意愿。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，关于人情的社会规范可能会阻止人们接受付费插队，一项实验表明，尽管提高报价能改善回应，但反复尝试会遭遇敌意。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可以通过使优先权请求常态化来克服这些摩擦，为互利的时间交易创造机会。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，作为一种基于市场的排队解决方案，纳米合同存在“市场蔓延”到社会规范管理领域的风险，引发了分配、效率、政治和伦理方面的关切。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这种商品化受到批评，特别是来自迈克尔·桑德尔的批评，他主张“排队伦理”，认为等待有时比支付意愿更能反映需求。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，迈克尔·桑德尔的“排队伦理”论点缺乏说服力，他质疑在一个大多数商品通过价格分配，且排队往往是该系统下游产物的市场经济中，该伦理的适用性。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，鉴于付费优先已常态化，对排队伦理的执着令人费解，且有证据表明，支付意愿而非等待意愿，更能强烈地反映价值。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，“等待意愿”(WtW)本质上比“支付意愿”(WtP)更具进步性的假设是错误的，因为空闲时间的分配不均，往往使穷人处于不利地位。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，他认为纳米合同通常可以更具进步性，因为依赖等待意愿对于像缺乏时间的贫困租户这样的个体而言可能是倒退的。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可以通过提供保留位置、有偿等待或付费优先的选择来改善排队等候，并提议为弱势群体提供可交易的优先权代币。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，虽然将私人商品的排队商品化或许可以接受，但对于像投票这样的公共供给品，市场分配存在缺陷，“排队伦理”应适用。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，社会已经决定某些物品，如选票或紧急医疗服务，应在市场之外进行分配，通过交易将其商品化会破坏平等和正义。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可能助长此类不受欢迎的交易，从而可能侵蚀社会规范，因此政策制定者必须识别并监管这些情境。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管纳米合同具有社会效用，但一个效率方面的担忧是潜在的“拥堵制造者”可能故意制造延迟，以便从急于通过的人那里收取费用。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这个“拥堵制造者”问题可能影响有限，因为拥堵制造者自身也承担实际成本，并且新出现的问题可以通过不予理睬或诸如禁令之类的“小范围精准干预措施”来解决。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，大量的个人和商业资源，如汽车和办公空间，仍未得到充分利用，这代表着纯粹的浪费。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同，特别是纳米租赁，提供了一种利用这种闲置能力的方式，例如共享未充分利用的宽带互联网服务就是例证。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，诸如用于物联网连接的Helium和用于食物共享的Olio等服务，展示了“纳米租赁”在日常交易中将未充分利用的容量货币化的潜力。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这延伸到服装租赁，并提议将纳米合同作为解决无人机空中通行权争议的一种替代方案。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，如果交易成本足够低，纳米租赁可以使个人出租各种未充分利用的个人资产，从书籍到计算能力。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管存在物理限制和争议成本等警示，但零工经济的成功表明，一旦交易成本显著降低，许多人会共享资产。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米租赁通过将未充分利用的资产货币化以获取收入并改善家庭流动性，从而为出租人带来益处。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，对于承租人而言，纳米租赁通过提供按需访问和专业化服务，减少了拥有资产的必要性，这与“产品即服务”模式相符。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同促进点对点租赁以更好地利用资源，允许人们在不拥有基础资产的情况下获得洗衣或宠物定位等服务。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这种新兴的纳米租赁模式挑战了传统所有权，表明可能从基于财产的系统向基于合同的资源获取方式演变。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同对私有制构成挑战，引发了关于临时性的租赁互动是否会削弱自主性以及个体与财产之间发展联系的担忧。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，普遍的纳米租赁还可能削弱“禀赋效应”，改变人们对财产的估值方式，因为财产变得更像交易商品。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，正如爱彼迎(Airbnb)所体现的，从私有制转变的趋势，可能出乎意料地与批判私有财产和过度消费的反消费主义哲学相一致。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同通过实现共享使用和减少浪费，提供了一种“生活即服务”模式，减轻了环境影响并颠覆了传统的财产观念。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，财产最好被视为一种资产使用的结构体系，而非可分割的权利，而新兴的具有低交易成本的“纳米合同”使得精细调整的治理机制成为可能。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这些纳米租赁挑战了传统合同法，特别是《统一商法典》第2条（销售）和第2A条（租赁），因为小规模租赁变得难以与许可区分。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，针对过剩容量的纳米合同，如将未充分利用的宽带商业化，引发了分配政策方面的担忧，因为这可能增加总体使用量和服务成本，造成不公平的交叉补贴。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管存在这些担忧，但正如对优步(Uber)的研究表明，纳米签约也可以减少净容量使用并改善福利。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，虽然纳米租赁可以显著提高资产利用率，但生产商可能会通过合同阻止此类租赁，类似于限制电子设备的维修。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这种从财产到纳米合同的转变也引发了关于自主性的哲学问题、关于合同分类的法律问题以及分配方面的担忧。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可以催生“纳米工作”，允许个人利用闲暇时间从事极短期的、非正式的付费任务，如数据标注，这是在零工经济模式基础上的发展。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这可以开发一个巨大的、未被充分利用的劳动力市场，提供低门槛的收入，并可能为小型付费任务带来具有进步意义的广泛机会。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，虽然一个普遍的批评是零工经济利用了监管套利，但最近的研究表明这可能被夸大了，平台可以为工人提供显著的工资福利。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，一个主要的担忧是它可能将旨在保护工人的雇佣法转变为纯粹的合同协议，从而创造出一个保障较少的工人阶层。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，在纳米合同中，工作以分钟衡量，这将使得假期和最低工资等传统雇佣保护措施极难实施，从而加剧了零工工人分类的挑战。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，政策应对措施可能包括扩大社会保障体系或将纳米就业作为一种反贫困机制来重点关注。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同在就业方面提供了无与伦比的灵活性和潜力，允许被传统劳动力市场排斥的个人通过利用额外时间找到收入来源。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米工作也引发了担忧，例如通过将工作扩展到休闲时间而侵蚀个人空间，以及使雇佣法方面的挑战更加困难，可能削弱工人权益的维护。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可以扩展合意协议的范围，从而将通常管辖非合意事故的侵权法的大量领域转变为合同法。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，一个例子可以说明这一点：火车运营商利用纳米合同与农民进行实时拍卖，以确定火花排放成本最低的方向，这与事后进行有问题的侵权评估形成对比。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可以通过实现“瞬时拍卖”来达到社会期望的结果，在拍卖中各方同意将不可避免的损害导向价值最低的资产，从而比回顾性的侵权法更有效地将损害降至最低。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，这些合同还可能提供分配上的优势，使受害者比在侵权法下（侵权法作为后备保障）获得更多的赔偿。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，纳米合同可以有效地最小化损害并提供可接受的事故赔偿，例如，如果事故频繁发生，农民从火车排放的火花中获得的收益可能超过作物收益，从而激励其采取预防措施。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管此类合同允许重新思考财产损害事故的可转让性，但由于涉及深层道德规范，对人身伤害应持谨慎态度。 * 阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，其文章旨在探讨数字化和通证化等趋势导致交易规模更小的“纳米”级交易所带来的重大影响，预见到这既会解放市场，也可能造成社会性的“交通拥堵”。阿拉巴马大学法学院的Yonathan Arbel教授写道，尽管纳米合同具有变革潜力，但也带来了令人不安的伦理困境，需要进一步的学术分析来指导其未来发展。